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As a source of wealth, commodities offer a great domestic resource, and yet their ability to deliver 
on growth  especially for developing countries  has been under question. From the 1950s 
onwards, commodities suffered from volatile prices, short lived price booms and terms of trade 
deterioration relative to manufactures. The low and often volatile commodity prices over a short 
term can have negative consequences for export revenues. Sustained changes over a medium or 
long term have relevance for a countrys terms of trade and therefore the industrial and trade 
policies and the priority that is given to the commodities sector within an economy. Countries that 
have natural resources can benefit from trading with countries in need of these resources. In a 
growingly integrated world, emerging economies unable to meet their demand from domestic 
sources are increasingly turning towards international markets to source raw materials for their 
growth. As the demand and supply of commodities becomes increasingly global, the factors 
affecting the price of these goods are also increasingly international.  
 
Commodity prices, particularly in the metals and minerals category, began to rise towards the end 
of 2003, and continued to rise for the next five years. The 2003-2008 commodity boom was the 
third price boom experienced since the Second World War. The price rise in base metals brought 
new opportunities for investment in resource rich countries, including those in Africa. China, the 
largest expanding economy in this period, was seeking raw materials to fuel its domestic 
infrastructure and manufacturing growth. In the middle of 2008, a financial crisis interrupted this 
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trend, and by June 2009, commodity prices had lost half their value compared to their peak in early 
2008. Advanced economies have been in recession and China has seen the slowest gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth for over a decade. The 2008/09 global financial crisis induced slowdown in 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies and emerging 
economies has depressed the demand for commodities. With the prospect of lower commodity 
demand from these countries lingering as a consequence of the expected slow recovery from the 
crisis, what expectations can we have for commodity prices? How will the behaviour of these 
prices affect the resource material driven engagement between China with Africa?  
 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter first examines the three post World War II 
commodity booms in 1951-1953, 1972-1975 and 2003-2008, looking at the supply and demand 
factors behind the price rises. It then contrasts the 2003-2008 period with the previous two to assess 
whether the latest boom was unique in any manner. Thereafter, we examine the largest driver of 
commodity demand, China and the structural nature of this demand. In the following section, we 
turn towards the resource-driven trade and investment from China towards Africa and the policy 
issues that arise from the long-term nature of this engagement. Since the metals and minerals sector 
experienced the most sustained price gains in this period, we focus on base metals in particular and 








Commodity prices tend to be cyclical, fluctuating over a period of time. They tend to respond to 
physical market fundamentals as well as other financial indicators such as interest rates, stock-
markets and currency fluctuations. Commodity cycles tend to be asymmetrical and expansion and 
contraction phases are not equal in length. Studies by Labys et al (2000) and Cashin et al (1999) 
both indicate that commodity prices tend to spend longer times in contraction when compared to 
expansion. The length of the expansion and contraction will differ between agricultural and mineral 
commodities and within each sector. Cashin et al (1999) also indicate that the time spent in 




A commodity price boom occurs within a price cycle, and is identified as its expansionary phase. A 
commodity boom is a sharp increase or explosion in international commodity prices in all the 
sub-categories of agricultural, minerals and metals and energy commodities (Radetzki 2008). Since 
there is no formal definition of a commodity boom, for our purposes we define a commodity boom 
as one in which a price peak is achieved that is higher than previous localized peaks and study the 
three identified price booms. Increases in prices are usually triggered by a shock in market 
fundamentals, which may be caused by unanticipated changes in either demand or supply or both. 
Although shocks can drive changes in cyclical movement, some shocks are temporary while others 
are permanent. Depending on their nature, the degree of persistence of the shock will differ as well 
(Cuddington 1992, Reinhart and Wickham 1994). For commodities, three price booms have been 
identified post World War II. The first was in 1951-1953, the second in 1972-1975, and the latest 
started in 2003 and ended in mid-2008. 
 
 
2.2 The First Commodity Price Boom of 1951-53 
 
The first post World War II boom in commodity prices occurred over 1951-1953. Commodity 
prices peaked in the first quarter of 1951, and were 45 percent above their 1949 values. However, 
the boom rapidly lost momentum, with prices only rising by 16 percent over their 1949 values in 
the second quarter of 1952 (Figure 7.1). The rise in prices was not spread equally across all 
commodities. Agricultural prices rose more than metals and peaked in early 1951 while metal 
prices peaked in mid 1952. Energy prices remained stable around their 1949 values.  
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Source: Radetzki (2006) 
The 1950 price boom appeared at the end of an economic recession as the global economy 
experienced a recovery. As industrial production (IP) began to pick up pace, demand for industrial 
raw materials increased. The International Monetary Funds (IMF) IP index for advanced industrial 
countries rose from 16, to 21 over 1949-1953. However, expectations of widespread shortages, 
spurned by memories of the Great Depression led to an increase in consumer purchases and 
hoarding. The second impetus underlying commodity demand in the early the 1950s was a result of 
the Korean War. As the United States went on to a war footing, increased industrial production 
increased the demand for commodities. The metals sector saw the second highest increase in prices 
in this boom and can be linked to the increased spending within the US, reflecting the strong 
demand for metals.  
 
Threats to the security of supply, with the Korean War in a major production area of industrial raw 
material, led to increasing pressure to build inventories, and prices in this sector responded by 
rising quickly. The push for increased inventories was responsible for short term supply constraints 
rather than fundamental constrictions in the supply side. The two sectors, energy and food, where 
supply security was not perceived, and therefore stockpiling was not an issue, did not experience 
the same level of price increase as industrial raw material. The major consumers of agricultural 
products and energy were in general self-sufficient at this period of time, and so a major import 
demand did not originate in the global economy. The United States was an oil exporter at this stage 
and there had been no significant harvest failure to cause security scares in the food sector. Security 
issues did not arise in the energy and food, and so no efforts were made to stockpile in these sectors. 
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The 1951-1953 commodity boom was more about perceived supply security issues rather than 
actual bottleneck in the supply side. Eventually the very increase in inventories responsible for 
rising prices was also the cause of the end of the price boom when large destocking took place. 
 
 
2.3 The Second Commodity Price Boom of 1972-75  
 
In the Second Commodity price boom all commodities experienced increasing prices, with 
differences in the timing and duration of that price increase. Prices started to rise in the last quarter 
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Source: UNCTAD Statistics online [http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1889&lang=1] accessed February 2009 
 
Agricultural raw material prices were the earliest to peak in the first quarter of 1974 followed by 
food prices peaking in the last quarter of 1974. Compared to 1971, prices had just about doubled in 
these two sectors. The largest price increases were seen in the oil sector, prices initially doubled 
between the first and last quarter of 1973, but by the end of 1975 rose by four and a half times their 
1971 values. By contrast metals prices only doubled between the first quarter of 1972 and second 
quarter of 1974. Although the price index for all commodities was higher at the end of 1975 than 
                                                
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
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its value in 1972, only the increase in oil prices was permanent, while the others returned near to 
their pre-boom levels.  
 
The early 1970s was a period of expanding economic activity in the Western world. The IMF IP 
index for the advanced economies rose by 15 percent between 1971 and 1976. The demand surge 
for commodities came from the simultaneous economic expansion of three major industrial 
regions: the US, Western Europe and Japan. On average, the OECD economies experienced annual 
GDP growth of 4.4 percent in 1969-71 and 3.2 percent in 1972-75. Japans annual average GDP 
growth was 9.3 percent and 4.6 percent over the same period. The Soviet Union experienced bad 
harvests for two consecutive years in 1971 and 1972 with South Asia and North America suffering 
crop failure in 1972. The resultant short fall of supply to meet demand led to an increase in food 
prices. Agricultural raw material prices were affected when the traditional producers of these 
commodities turned land towards growing food crops rather than cash crops. Thus, the supply 
deficits from the food sector were passed on to the cash crops sector.  
Politically, the major event during this period was the Arab-Israel war that led to oil embargos 
being raised by certain Middle East oil producers on western countries. This was also the period 
where the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel asserted its power 
over oil prices leading to the first of the oil price shocks to the global economy in 1973. In the hard 
commodities sectors, prices rose due to supply constraints. Strikes in Chile had reduced copper 
exports, while Jamaica and later other bauxite producers imposed huge tax increases on this 
mineral commodity (Fried 1976). This led to increasing supply constraints in the metals and 
mineral sectors leading to rising prices in the metals category. More generally, these supply 
constraints occurred at a time when demand was strong. The price boom receded when economic 




2.4 The Third Commodity Price Boom of 2003-2008 
 
The 2003-2008 commodity boom is associated with a major expansion of the global economy. 
International commodity prices began to rise for most sectors from 2003 and continued on an 
upward trend until mid-2008. Between 2000 and 2003, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) All Commodities Price Index rose from 100 to 105, and by 2007 it 
had doubled to 207. Different commodities experienced different price increases, and as Figure 7.3 
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shows, oil and metals and minerals experienced much higher prices than agricultural or soft 
commodities. By mid-2008, when the global financial crisis emerged, prices crashed for all sectors, 
although by the end of 2008 the indices for all sectors were still above their 2000 values.  
 
The demand for commodities was generated in two main country groupings. The first was the IMF 
IP Index for the advanced industrial economies (70 percent of world GDP) which rose from 98 in 
2003 to 108 in 2007. The second was the non-OECD economies, such as China and India, which 
exhibited growth at an per annum average of 10 percent over the 2000-2007 period. The demand 
for base metals from China has been responsible for the bulk of increase seen in global demand for 
base metals (Figure 7.4). Over 1995-2000, Chinas share of new demand was less than 50 percent, 
but in 2000-2007 it accounted for more than half the increase in demand for aluminium, nickel and 
steel, and nearly all of the increase in demand for copper and zinc.  
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Source: UNCTAD Statistics online [www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1889&lang=%201] accessed September 2009 
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Source: Macquarie Commodities Research (September 2008) Overview of Commodities Outlook with Focus on Copper, Zinc and Coking Coal, 
Company Presentation.  
Whereas substantial growth was seen in the demand for commodities, the supply side remained 
constrained in the metals sectors in 2003-2008. The initial increase in demand in the early 2000s 
was met by using long built up inventories and stocks at producers, consumers and international 
exchanges. The London Metals Exchange, which is the premier metals trading exchange, saw 
inventories of copper drop from 856 kilo ton (kt).  in 2002 to 49 kt. in 2004, and slightly rising to 
199 kt. in 2007.2 Only in the second half of 2008, as the recession set in and global demand 
decreased, did inventory levels begin to rise again. Exploration budgets in mining, and investment 
into new capacity was also limited during the initial years of the price boom and only began to 
materialise after 2005. Exploration budgets in the 1990s averaged at US$3.7 billion per annum, and 
only after 2003 did budgets begin to rise from US$3.8 billion in 2004 to US$10.5 billion in 2007. 
The 2003-2008 commodity prices were mainly driven by unanticipated demand surge from China 
and inadequate supply response from the minerals and metal sector. As inventories began to be 
drawn down, with limited new supply coming on line, the price surge was a logical reaction to the 
physical market fundamentals. Only as growth slowed and demand receded in the second half of 
2008 were inventories rising, leading to an end in the commodity price boom.  
 
 
2.5 Comparing the Commodity Booms 
 
                                                




Supply and demand imbalances are likely to trigger a commodity price hike. In the 1951-1953 and 
1972-75 period, price increases were a response to events occurring in the supply side of the 
equation rather than unanticipated demand itself. Demand for hard commodities is generated by 
industrial production and GDP growth. The 1951-1953 boom occurred at a time when the world 
was recovering from both a serious economic recession and the aftermath of World War II. The 
recovery started as early as the end of 1949 and in 1950, and demand for commodities was 
expected to continue to rise. It was the possibility of supply disruptions due to the Korean War 
(1950-1953) that increased inventory demand as a response to supply insecurities. In the 1972-
1975 boom, economic expansion had been prevalent in the previous few years and industrial 
demand for commodities had been fulfilled. Western Europe and Japans industrial expansion was 
gradually building up in the late 1960s and was not unanticipated. As in the previous boom, it was 
supply side insecurities that triggered responses in demand to build up inventories. As global 
recession started to set in by 1975, the demand for commodities also decreased. The 2003-2008 
commodity boom came at a time where the global economy was recovering from the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/98, and the bursting of the Dot Com bubble in 2000/01. Removed from 
these financial events to a large extent, was the strong GDP growth in China, which was sustaining 
an average 8 percent growth rate per year for over a decade. No major supply disruptions are 
evident in this period, and it was the unanticipated demand from China that played a more 
important role in the 2003-2008 boom.  
 
The first two booms were driven by disruptions in supply and were also over when supply came 
back in balance with demand. The third boom on the other hand was very much about demand, and 
subsided after the demand element receded rather than due to a major response from the supply 
sector. In the two earlier booms, the demand drivers were the industrialised economies. However, 
in contrast, the 2003-2008 commodity prices have been driven to a very large extent by the 
economic expansion in China. In order to understand the impact of Chinese demand on commodity 




3.  Structural Change in China and Commodity Demand 
 
Commodity demand in the real economy is derived from their usage as inputs or intermediate 
products. The intensity of usage per capita is dependent on the structural nature of the economy. 
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Metals and minerals are intensively used in a number of sectors: infrastructure, construction 
(urbanization) and manufactures. Therefore, any economy where the major share of the GDP 
comes from manufacturing and infrastructure expenditure, will be using more commodities relative 
to other economies with similar GDP levels, but where the primary or the services sector is driving 
growth. At low per capita income levels only basic needs can be met and as such metal 
consumption remains low. As income levels rise, demand for consumer products, housing and 
infrastructure are likely to grow, generating higher demand for minerals and metals. As advanced 
economy status is reached and domestic growth in infrastructure and construction slows down, 
consumption of metals fall as well. Therefore low income or less developed countries (LDCs)  
which tend to have small industrial sectors  will have low rates of industrial commodity 
consumption. Advanced economies (AEs)  typically having a much larger service sector than 
industrial sector  will too have a low industrial commodity consumption rate. Generally, emerging 
or newly industrialising economies will experience higher rates of industrial commodity growth per 
percentage point increase in GDP in relation to both LDCs and AEs (Radetzki 2006). 
 
The income elasticity of demand for commodities will change as an economy moves from an 
agrarian to an industrial based structure. This shift will also be accompanied by rural-to-urban 
migration, and rising urbanisation rates will further spur the demand for commodities. The income 
elasticity of demand for commodities is higher for economies with emerging industrial sectors in 
comparison to when the primary or services sector is the lead sector in GDP, leading to demand 
disruptions in commodity prices in the former case. Figure 7.5 provides a cross country comparison 
of GDP per capita and the share of mineral and metals costs in industrial production for selected 
emerging and advanced economies. GDP per capita is used to indicate development levels, while 
the share of mineral costs is used as a proxy for metals consumption within an economy. A simple 
quadratic equation is fitted to the data points to indicate a trend line.  
 
Figure 7.5  Percent Share of Costs of Minerals / Extractive Sector in Industrial Production and per 




Source: Authors calculations based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Program ( www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu)  and the World Development 
Indicators (December 2008) database (www.worldbank.org/data), accessed June 2009  
 
Starting from the left hand side of the figure, low per capita income is associated with the highest 
relative consumption ratios of minerals and metals within an industrial economy. As we move 
along the curve, middle income countries correlate with lower consumption, while towards the 
right hand side the clustering of advanced economies are associated with the lowest consumption 
of metals and minerals in the industrial sector. From Figure 7.5, we note that China is in the region 
of low income countries, and lies just below the curve. This would indicate that its expenditure on 
minerals and metals conforms to patterns seen in other developing countries and is in no way 
exceptional. Chinas current consumption patterns of metals are in line with the normal patterns of 
growth, and as its income levels rise we expect it to move down and along the curve. However, 
given the large size of China, the impact that its demand makes on the international markets is 
through the large volume rather than differing consumption patterns.  
 
Chinas economic growth has been phenomenal by any standard of development, with GDP growth 
averaging 10 percent per annum from 1990 to 2007. In 2006 and 2007 this rate climbed to 12 
percent per year. This growth has been driven mainly by the industrial sector which accounted for 
48 percent of value added in GDP in 2006. The increasing economic activity within China is a 
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major driver for its domestic growth. The share of the industrial sector accounts for nearly half of 
Chinas national output, considerably higher than the 22 percent average for advanced economies, 
29 percent for Japan, and even in comparison to transition and emerging economies such as South 
Korea (40 percent) and Russia (40 percent). Expenditure on physical capital investment in China 
was 43 percent of GDP in 2006, much higher than the 18 percent for Germany and 29 percent for 
South Korea. 3  Rapid urbanisation growth in China has also further intensified the countrys 
demand for commodities. The United Nations Population Division expects Chinese urban 
population to rise to 684 million by 2015 and to 890 million by 2030. In order to accommodate 
such large urban populations, construction and infrastructure needs will generate still further 
demand for metals and minerals. 
 
The resource intensive stage for China is likely to continue for the medium to long term. Although 
it is one of the largest economies in the world, it is still in many respects a developing country. In 
comparison to high income OECD economies, where the per capita income was around US$35,000 
in 2007, Chinas per capita income was just US$5,083.4 As China achieves higher per capita 
income levels, its consumption patterns should be similar to that of a middle income country, such 
as Korea, and eventually of an advanced economy such as the United States. Therefore its demand 
for commodities will eventually taper off, but not in the near future. 
 
As the scale of the financial crisis began to manifest itself in the second half of 2008, by early 2009 
Chinas expected GDP growth rate fell to 8 percent from the anticipated 12 percent estimated the 
previous year. As consumption levels in its major export markets began to fall, so manufacturing 
activity decreased in China and unemployment increased. In order to combat the recession and 
avert an economic slow down, the Chinese government employed various stimulus packages to 
help domestic growth to replace lost export markets. In November 2008, China announced US$586 
billion to be spent on rebuilding houses destroyed in the summer earthquake and still more 
infrastructure projects, including railroads, airports, subways and bridges in the next two years. A 
fall in interest rates and other schemes to encourage domestic consumption have been put into 
place, although it is too early to tell as to what degree these programmes will be successful in 
maintaining domestic growth in the long term.  
 
Table 7.1 Chinas Importance for Commodity Exporting Developing Countries, 1990-2006 
                                                




 Percent Share Region in Chinese Imports of Base Metals 
Region 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Low & Middle Income 30 46 46 56 
Latin America 9 17 18 27 
Asia 6 6 8 13 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6 9 6 5 
 Percent Share of China in Regions Exports of Base Metals  
 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Low & Middle Income 2 7 11 27 
Latin America 1 5 9 24 
Asia 6 18 35 80 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 10 12 26 
 
Source: Authors calculations from COMTRADE database accessed via WITS in July 2009.  
 
Trade is a large driver of Chinas economic growth, accounting for 72 percent of GDP in 2006, but 
the Chinese growth miracle has not all been about its exports. In 2006, exports were valued at 40 
percent of GDP, but importantly imports were valued at 32 percent. As China sources industrial 
and agricultural raw material through imports, its growth is increasingly becoming a source of 
revenue for natural resource exporting developing countries. With a rise in Chinas demand for 
commodities, increasingly developing countries are benefitting from higher exports to China. The 
importance of China for commodity exporting developing countries is rising, and vice versa. Low 
and middle income countries as a whole accounted for 30 percent of Chinese base metal imports in 
1990 (Table 7.1). By 2006, they accounted for 56 percent of these imports. The largest increase 
was seen in the share of the Latin American region, which is Chinas main source of copper 
imports. Asia is Chinas major source of tin, and the regions share of base metal imports increased 
from 6 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 2006. Sub-Saharan Africas share in Chinese imports has 
tended to remain stable since the early 1990s. 
  
As important as these developing regions are as a source of imports for China, Chinas importance 
for these regions as a primary destination is also increasing. As the second section of Table 7.1 
indicates, China increasingly accounts for the exports of these developing countries. In 1990, as an 
export destination it accounted for only 2 percent of their base metals export market. By 2006 this 
had increased to 27 percent. Asias exports have seen the greatest export diversion, from 2 to 80 
percent, followed from Latin America (1 to 24 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (2 to 26 percent). 
Chinas still burgeoning economic growth rate and growing importance in commodity trade for 
developing regions suggests that it will continue to be an important source of export revenues for 










As other chapters in this book have examined, Africas importance for China has been steadily 
increasing, linked to its potential as a largely untapped source for oil and minerals and metals. One 
of the major vectors of this deepening engagement has centred on natural resources sector. Africa 
has some of the largest reserves of metals and minerals on the planet, and the potential for further 
growth in production is considerable. In 2006, the ratio of production to reserves for manganese, 
cobalt and aluminium was as low as 34 percent, 33 percent and 9 percent respectively (Table 7.2). 
In other metals the production to reserve ratio is quite high such as for platinum (90 percent), gold 
(48 percent) and chromium (91 percent). The United States Geological Survey estimates that 
between 2000 and 2013, Africas production of platinum, aluminium and copper will increase by 
119 percent, 109 percent and 360 percent respectively. 
 
Raw material supply security for the future is a major issue for the Chinese, and given the recent 
period of high international commodity prices, China is looking for continued secured access to 
raw materials. The Chinese presence within Africa is increasingly being viewed as Chinas 
attempts to secure its resource basket (Kaplinsky and Farooki 2009). Chinas activities in the 
continent are mainly seen as resource seeking where trade, aid and FDI are often linked to the 
resource rich countries. The Chinese government itself acknowledges that part of its strategic 
policy is to secure supply of essential commodities and oil for its own development.  
 
Table 7.2  Africas share of Global Production and Reserves (percent share) 
Mineral Production Reserves Ratio 
Platinum Group Metals 54 60+ 0.90 
Gold 20 42 0.48 
Chromium 40 44 0.91 
Manganese 28 82 0.34 
Vanadium 51 95 0.54 
Cobalt 18 55+ 0.33 




Source: African Development Bank (2008)  
 
Chinese assistance to Africa is covered by the State Council and three main ministries: The 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other 
institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China and Chinese embassies in African countries 
also assist in finding and funding projects. Between 2007 and 2009, the Forum on China Africa 
Corporation (FOCAC) aimed to provide preferential loans of US$3 billion and credits worth US$2 
billion for preferential export buyers in Africa. The China-Africa Development Fund will provide 
US$5 billion to support Chinese firms investing in Africa and the establishment of Special Export 
Zones. Other financial assistance includes debt cancellation for some of the LDCs in Africa. 
Between 2000 and 2003, an estimated US$1.27 to US$1.38 billion loans were converted to grants. 
In 2005, a further commitment to reduce loans by a value of US$1.3 billion was made. Broadman 
(2008) reports concessional loans to Africa reached US$800 million in 2005, covering 55 projects 
in 22 countries.  
 
As China began to emerge in the international global scene, its outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows remained small, equivalent to just US$916 million in 2000, not much higher than the 
US$830 million in 1990.5 However, after 2000 FDI outflows rose significantly, rising to US$17.8 
billion in 2006. The flows are expected to continue to increase and reach an impressive US$72 
billion by 2011 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). Chinas investment in Africa is fairly well 
divided over different sectors. Over the 1979-2000 period, 46 percent of this investment was in the 
manufacturing sector, textiles being the main category. Services, mainly construction, accounted 
for 18 percent of the FDI inflows, with resource extraction accounting for 28 percent (UNCTAD, 
2007). By 2007, there were an estimated 700 Chinese enterprises operating in Africa (UNCTAD, 
2007).  Meanwhile, Chinas exports to Africa increased from US$2.4 billion in 1995 to US$36.8 
billion by 2007, and imports also saw a significant rise from US$1.4 billion to US$35.8 billion over 
the same period. Chinas US$1 billion trade surplus with Africa in 1995 changed to a trade deficit 
of US$1 billion by 2007. Oil related products are mostly responsible for this deficit, as Chinas 
non-oil trade balance has been in surplus, rising from US$1.3 billion in 1995 to US$18.8 billion by 
2006 (Figure 7.6).  
 
Figure 7.6 Chinas Exports and Imports from Africa in US$ million, 1990-2008 
                                                
5 The reporting mechanism for FDI may have also changed after 2000, and therefore may account for change in 
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Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (2009).  
 
In 1995, most of the Chinese exports to Africa were in the low technology6 (47 percent) and 
medium technology sectors (26 percent). By 2006, high technology products were taking a larger 
share of the exports (16 percent) as well as an increase in the medium technology products (33 
percent). Low technology products lost share and now account for 39 percent of Chinese exports to 
the continent. The top five products account for only 22 percent of its total exports to Africa. 
Telecommunication equipment (6 percent), cotton fabric and garments (13 percent) were some of 
the top Chinese exports in 2006. On the import side, Chinas imports from Africa were biased 
towards the primary (42 percent) and resource-based (39 percent) sectors in 1995. Over time this 
bias has been accentuated with these two categories accounting for 96 percent of total imports in 
2006. Petrol oils are the largest imports from Africa, and have risen from 22 percent in 1995 to 78 
percent by 2006. Ores and concentrates of base metals are the second largest and although their 
share has decreased from 11 percent in 1995 to just 5 percent in 2006, their value has actually 
increased from US$0.1 billion to US$1.3 billion over the same time.  
 
Cascading tariff barriers for African exports is also an issue, where China encourages the imports 
of unprocessed products while taxing processed goods. This has implications for manufactured 
exports (or potential exports) from African countries. However, recently China has granted 
Generalised System of Preferential (GPS) status to African exports, although it remains unclear 
how this will affect processed goods.  
 
4.2 Chinas Strategic Interest in Africa 
 
                                                
6 Technology category based on the Lalls (2000) taxonomy of such products. 
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China engages with a large number of countries in Africa, often funding investment in parts of the 
continent that are considered politically risky by other donor countries. In terms of both trade and 
FDI, Chinas main endeavours have been in the oil and mineral sectors and in infrastructure. But 
the range of activities is growing rapidly, including small-scale businesses such as trading, 
restaurants, beauty saloons and Chinese medicine centres. Chinas assistance to the continent has 
taken several shapes and forms, from health and education projects to the construction of official 
buildings, stadiums and roads. There has been a significant strategic integration by China in its 
approach to Africa. FDI and aid have been concentrated in economies which either have large oil 
and commodity sectors (Angola, Nigeria and South Africa), or which offer potential as raw 
material suppliers in the future, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
A distinctive feature of Chinas presence in Africa is a traditional reluctance to exert pressure on 
African governments with regard to patterns of governance (e.g. refusal to participate in Paris Club 
transparency initiative in Angola), internal politics (e.g. Darfur and Zimbabwe) or process 
standards in production, for example on ethical trade and environmental standards. However, there 
are signs that this hands-off approach is changing, with China providing an increasing number of 
peacekeeping troops in Africa (see Chapter 4). China is also very sensitive to criticism of its profile 
in Africa, to some extent reflected in its recent aid-FDI-trade venture in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, which appears to have answered some of the criticisms made of its approach towards 
exploiting Africas abundant resources. China has initiated a number of fora to enhance China-
Africa relationships. The largest of these is the aforementioned FOCAC (see Chapter 1), the first 
FOCAC ministerial meeting being held in Beijing in 2000, followed by the second in Addis Ababa 
in 2003. The third forum was held in 2006, also referred to as the China-Africa Summit, which was 
widely seen as Chinas attempt to shift up gears in its engagement with Africa. Non-resource rich 
countries have opportunities to gain from engagement with Africa as well. The spread of Chinese 
FDI has become more dispersed in 2005 in comparison to 1990. Assistance projects cover a wide 
range of countries, including the non-mineral economies. Fabric and telecommunication equipment 
are some of the largest Chinese exports to the continent and can be source of expansion of light 
manufacturing and the services sector. Apart from minerals and oil, China also imports cotton from 
Africa, which can help the agricultural sector gain from trade (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2008).  
 
The challenge therefore is to build on these mineral and agricultural sectors and improve value 
addition for exports. Of the emerging economies, China has the most resources at its disposal and 
is actively seeking markets and opportunities for engagement. Africa provides such a base, and 
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well-designed policies can help both regions gain from the experience. China has a clearly 
developed strategic approach towards Africa, involving multiple parties on the Chinese side. The 
strategic objectives are twofold: first, to obtain long-term access to Africas abundant resources (oil 
and minerals); and second, to obtain Africas support in the global arena. Chinese aid to Africa is 
free of conditionality (subject to a proviso that recipient countries do not recognise Taiwan), 
although there have been recent signs that it is more willing to consider the quality of internal 
governance in some African countries, e.g. providing peace-keeping forces, gentle pressures on 
Sudan with regard to Darfur. Insecurity in many parts of Africa is both a problem for Chinese 
operations and an opportunity. The opportunities are perhaps more evident, since it is the very 
insecurity of oil and mineral extraction in Africa (Sudan, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo) which provides the space for Chinese firms to enhance their presence. These bring both 
opportunities and risks to the African countries. Even with the 2008 decline in commodity prices 
and economic growth, China has continued to pursue mineral sector based engagement with Africa. 
In January 2009, China signed a US$2.3 billion deal with Liberia, the biggest FDI project in the 
country, for iron ore mining. Revamping the countrys rail network and electricity generation is 
also part of the agreement.7 Thompson (2009) reports in Zambia, Chinese owned firms opened 
copper smelters in January 2009, while other competitors were shutting down their plants. Despite 
the global downturn, Chinese investors are still looking to expand their markets in Africa, 
especially in the telecommunications sectors. Other firms that are looking to buy in the mineral and 
metals sector given the lower price for these resources due to a fall in commodity prices.  
 
Chinas growing presence in Africa has both positive and negative implications. If we focus on the 
direct impact, consumers, producers and governments can draw major benefits from engagement 
with China. However policy concerns remain in connection to this engagement. The implications 
of China-Africa engagement cover a whole variety of direct and indirect issues, as well as macro-, 
micro- and meso-level outcomes. On the one hand, China has brought much needed aid, trade and 
investment to African countries. In return, it has access to oil and other industrial commodities 
which are important for the countrys own economic development. While China has made 
contributions to developing the infrastructure in African countries, its exports may harm the 
manufacturing sector. Chinese demand for commodities has led to increased investments by 
Chinese and Western mining firms in Africa, but environmental, labour and equity issues remain. 
The increase in commodity prices is advantageous for natural resource abundant countries in 
                                                
7 Voice of America News, 23 January 2009. 
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attracting a higher price for their exported product and increased investments in their commodity 
sectors. A change in the direction of their terms of trade  driven by growth in large emerging 
economies like China, India and Brazil  brings new non-Western derived opportunities of growth. 
However, making the most of domestic natural resources raises policy issues that must be 
addressed by African countries, as is discussed below.  
 
 
4.3 Dealing with Rent Seeking Behaviour 
 
Rent seeking behaviour by the state does not allow for mineral wealth to be shared for the benefit 
of the entire population. Development is impeded when royalties from mineral resources received 
by the state are not transferred to the population through redistributive expenditures on health, 
education and other public goods. The general population will also suffer if the state uses its 
mineral wealth on non-development expenditure such as presidential palaces and expenditure on 
luxury vehicles for state officials. Finally, the state in receiving resources from outside the country, 
will not consider itself accountable to its own people. This often leads to non-democratic state 
behaviour. In extreme cases, conflict and civil war may break out with opposing factions trying to 
take control of the centre to which resource rents are paid. Such rent seeking has caused conflict in 
most African countries that China has closer economic relations, and with increasing commodity 
prices there is now more wealth to fight over. Recent efforts to circumvent rent seeking states have 
included the Chad-Cameroon pipeline supported by the World Bank (Pegg 2005, Heller 2006). 
Rents from the resources were earmarked for specific development sectors from the beginning and 
monitoring and evaluation teams were trained to ensure that the funds flowed to their appropriate 
budget heads. There are also other successful cases such as Angola, where the African 
Development Bank has been assigned a key role in monitoring resource revenues. These kinds of 
policy options can be used to ensure that development from mineral resources is delivered to a 
wider population leading the entire country to benefit from its natural resources. 
 
With higher competition for Africas resources, mining deals are coming under increased scrutiny 
from international institutions. The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the first 
example, and more will follow, where mining investment deals have come under strong scrutiny by 
other international financial institutions. The DRC government negotiated a mining investment deal 
worth US$9 billion with China, giving the latter extensive mining rights in the region. A sum of 
US$3 billion was to be invested in the mine area itself, while the remaining money was to be 
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divided further into two tranches, to be spent on developing roads, railways, hospitals and 
universities. Although this was the largest ever foreign investment in the DRC, the IMF and OECD 
were cautious about the negative impact of this deal on the DRCs debt repayment obligations. 
After tense negotiations, the deal went ahead, although the US$3 billion for infrastructure support 
was suspended.8 The negotiations involving the African host country, the Chinese and the IMF 
indicates the growing scrutiny that new mining deals are receiving and the importance being given 
to ensure that such investment are not harmful to the country in the long run. 
 
 
4.4. Dealing with the Dutch Disease 
 
The Dutch Disease arises from two related processes. The first is the deindustrialization of the 
economy due to a growing domestic natural resource sector (e.g. oil, gas) that crowds out other 
sectors. The second is from the appreciation of the exchange rate due to growing demand for the 
same domestic natural resource that makes exports from non-resource sector less price competitive 
in international markets. However, as the Netherlands has shown, with a comprehensive industrial 
and monetary policy, these affects can be dealt with effectively. Industrial and trade policy can 
address issues of de-industrialisation within the domestic economy and support the non-trade sector. 
Malaysia has used a balanced approach to develop its natural resource and manufacturing sectors 
together, with success. New Zealand and Australia are both examples of commodity exporting 
countries that have diversified their economies without abandoning their resource sectors.  
 
The de-industrialisation problems associated with the Dutch Disease also need to be considered in 
the context of resource-rich developing economies. Some of these countries do not have a 
substantial manufacturing sector to speak off, as applies to many if not most African nations 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2008). Concentrating on commodity exporting may further exacerbate 
problems in the fledgling manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, with Chinas high income 
elasticity of demand for commodities, the absorption of their commodity export output is largely 
guaranteed. The balancing act between export sectors that will generate high revenues for the 
medium term, at the cost of further ignoring the manufacturing sector, becomes even more 
important for these developing countries. These are not easy policy challenges but for the present it 
is argued that effective policy support is required by these countries to mitigate the effects of the 
                                                
8 The Financial Times, 18.08.09 China and Congo Change Tack on Deal. 
21 
 
Dutch Disease. The use of industrial and monetary policy in these cases, to dissipate the impact of 
a strong commodity exporting sector, with appropriate state interventions has been suggested by a 
number of scholars (Ross 1999, 2001; McMahon 1997; Saaraf and Jiwanji 2001).  
 
 
4.5 To Industrialise or Not to Industrialise? 
 
Industrialization has long been held as a panacea for development and is evidenced to have 
delivered growth for a wide range of countries. Now that the rise in commodity prices can also 
contribute to growth, should natural resource abundant countries still focus on industrialisation? 
This is a difficult question to answer. Natural resources are now in a better position as a sector to 
assist growth, with the capability of generating higher export revenues relative to previous periods 
of lower commodity prices. However effectively using these export revenues for economic growth 
and development, and to ensure the proceeds are spent for the greater good of the local population 
remains challenging.  
The enclave nature of the mining sector, with its limited forward and backward linkages, tends to 
restrict its multiplier effect within an economy. Given the capital-intensive nature of mining, the 
sector makes greater demand on capital investments which are more scarce in a developing country 
relative to labour. Mining will not generate the same amount of employment as does the 
manufacturing or agricultural sector. There are also issues of rent seeking behaviour on part of the 
State, which can have a detrimental effect on economic growth (Moore, 2001; Auty 2001). When a 
government receives royalties for its natural resources, without a strong system of accountability 
and responsibility to the people in place, the temptation for the State to ransack the country for its 
own gains can be large (Mkandawire, 2005). On the more positive side, in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, commodity exploitation and industrialization moved in parallel and with the 
right policy mix and state intervention, economic growth was possible in a number of countries 
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(Wright and Czelusta 2004). If countries are to benefit from their natural resource sectors and not 
remain focused on industrialisation alone to deliver economic growth, strong political and 
institutional policies need to be developed. Resource rents can be accompanied by a positive 
growth effect as long as a country has good institutions (Collier and Goderis, 2007). Arzeki and 
van der Ploeg (2007) and Mehlum et al. (2006) show a negative impact of resource dependence on 
growth rates only when the quality of institutions is worse than a critical level. Fasano (2002) 
documents the case for United Arab Emirates which spent its resource rents on modern 
infrastructure and education turning the curse into a blessing. Acemoglu et al. (2003) offer similar 
findings for resource rich Botswana.  
This chapter focuses on resource-rich developing countries, particularly those exporting minerals 
and metals. However there are a large number of non-resource rich developing countries. During 
the high oil and food prices in mid 2008, most of them suffered from ballooning import bills, while 
facing intense competition in their manufactures export markets from China. These countries do not 
have the luxury of exploiting natural resources. At the same time, manufactured exports from China 
are a direct threat to their domestic manufacturing sector and indirect threat in their export markets.  
It is difficult to offer a simple answer as to whether these countries should continue to industrialize. 
A helpful way forward is offered by Kaplinsky (2009) in analysing the impact of Chinas growth 
on African countries. If Africa exports what China imports then Africa benefits, as is the case when 
China exports what Africa imports. This leads to a win-win situation. For example, Africas exports 
of minerals and metals are beneficial as Chinese demand for these products has increased prices 
and can generate revenues for African countries. In the case of Chinese exports, low cost 
manufactured items (e.g. footwear, clothing and household electronic items) when imported into 
Africa, benefit domestic consumers. Therefore the benefit to the African consumers of low cost 
Chinese imports, while the revenue from high prices commodity exports can result in a win-win 
situation. 
 
Kaplinsky (2009) also points out that there are indirect trade vectors that may harm Africa. This is 
likely to occur when Africa exports the same goods as China, or when Africa imports the same 
commodities as China. For example, Chinas demand for oil has had some impact in increasing oil 
prices, which has also increased the oil import bill for African countries. While Angola and Nigeria 
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may benefit from high oil prices, the rest of the African nations are oil importers. Similarly, textiles 
and clothing are a major African export to the United States under the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). With increased Chinese exports after the removal of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement in 2005, exports from the AGOA region declined by 21 percent between 2005 and 2007 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2008).  
 
Domestic policy issues have to ensure that cheap Chinese imports do not severely challenge or 
destroy local manufacturing capability. Similarly in signing agreements over mineral rights and 
concessions, the State has to ensure that an equitable distribution of rents takes place, and the 
benefits are passed on to the local communities. Environmental and labour standards also need to 
be enforced. Therefore while Chinese engagement may bring opportunities, the African 
governments need to ensure that policies are in place to fully benefit from these ventures. These are 
complex political and economic issues, and the most important component of this engagement has 
to be the response of the African governments. The policy proposals, agreements and 
implementation by the African States are in large part going to determine how beneficial Chinese 






The 2003-2008 commodity boom saw a sustained increase in prices over the period, and unlike the 
previous two post World War II commodity booms, was driven by unanticipated shifts in demand 
rather than supply disruptions. The major increase in base metals demand originated from the 
resource-intensive stage of economic growth in China and is likely to lead to a prolonged increase 
in commodity prices for over a decade or more, referred to as a commodity price super cycle 
The Chinese demand for metals and minerals is largely due to the increased expenditure on 
infrastructure, construction and manufacturing. China may be the worlds second largest economy 
by size, but it is still essentially a developing economy and far from reaching mature economy 
status. The structural nature of Chinas commodity demand indicates its continued need for natural 
resources.  
 
Chinas deepening engagement with Africa has also centred on access to these resources, aimed at 
securing raw material over the long term, and hence it continues to invest in mining and investment 
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activities in the continent. Beijing has tended to focus its combination of aid, trade and FDI policies 
on Africas resource rich countries, although China is also expanding into other parts of the African 
continent. We can expect this engagement to be a reasonably long one, until China reaches a 
mature economy status and its commodity consumption rate begins to decline. Yet with its size and 
current state of development, China can absorb potentially very high levels of imports from 
developing countries. As an engine of global economic growth, China plays an important role in 
generating development for other developing economies. This provides African countries with an 
opportunity to benefit from their natural resources, but policy issues remain around growth led by 
the commodities sector. Rent seeking behaviour and the Dutch Disease remain of notable concern 
for countries where their manufacturing sectors are already struggling to take root. Good 
governance is also under stress where resource rents are concerned, as large resource revenues can 
cause more harm if not handled effectively. However, international financial institute support from 
the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the IMF can help to balance these issues and 
ensure that Africas mineral wealth is used for improved public benefit. The responsibility to deal 
effectively with the Chinese and to negotiate contracts for access to minerals rests primarily with 
the state. The DRC governments negotiations with Beijing demonstrate the opportunity to gain 
valuable infrastructure and social sector investments in return for mining rights. With increased 
competition for these commodities, African states will find themselves in a stronger position to 
negotiate treaties that suit their development goals more effectively. The context of commodities 
and growth cover complex political and economic policy issues, and the most important component 
of this engagement have to be the response of the developing country governments. The policy 
proposals, agreements and implementation by these states are in large part going to determine how 
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